In this talk, I'll defend the application of ordinary, virtue-theoretic notions of courage and cowardice to belief formation and suspension—viz., what I'll call doxastic courage and doxastic cowardice. As a moral virtue, courage characteristically involves defying fear or anxiety for the sake of a moral good. (Cowardice, by contrast, involves capitulating to fear or anxiety in spite of a moral good.) So to argue that there is a distinctive kind of doxastic courage, I'll first suggest, drawing on empirical work in psychology, that there is a kind of fear or anxiety distinctively related to belief formation and suspension—doxastic anxiety—and that this fear or anxiety is something which we can plausibly defy or capitulate to in settling, or refusing to settle, salient open questions. I'll then suggest that whether we settle, suspend, or positively abandon a particular belief in the face of doxastic anxiety is, in at least some cases, apt for intuitive normative appraisal; and that the normative nature and upshot of this appraisal is, in at least some cases, intuitively moral. Believing (or failing to believe) can itself be morally courageous, apart from the moral virtue of downstream actions; and believing (or failing to believe) can itself be morally cowardly, over and above epistemic vice.